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This paper studies the survival of ﬁxed exchange rate regimes. The probabil-
ity of an exit from a ﬁxed exchange rate regime depends on the time spent within
this regime. In such a context durations models are appropriate, in particular be-
cause of the possible non-monotonic pattern of duration dependence. Non-parametric
estimates show that the pattern of duration dependence exhibits non-monotonic be-
haviour and that it diﬀers across types of economies. This behaviour persists when
we control for time-varying covariates in a proportional hazard speciﬁcation. We
conclude that how long a regime has lasted will aﬀect the probability that it will
end, in a non-monotonic fashion.
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11 Introduction and motivation
The widespread wave of currency and ﬁnancial crises that has aﬀected developed and
emerging market economies during the last decade has brought the issue of optimal ex-
change rate policy back to the forefront of the research agenda in international macroeco-
nomics. In particular, much attention has been given to exits from ﬁxed to ﬂexible exchange
rate regimes, their nature, as well as their macroeconomic, ﬁnancial and institutional de-
terminants. Most empirical studies make use of discrete-choice econometric speciﬁcations,
whereby the dependent variable takes a value of unity whenever an exit occurs, and zero
otherwise.
This paper is about the survival of ﬁxed exchange rate regimes. We argue that the
time spent within a given regime is likely to determine the probability that a regime will
end. Klein and Marion (1997) and Duttagupta and Otker-Robe (2003) introduce duration
as an explanatory variable in a logit speciﬁcation. The statistical signiﬁcance of the at-
tached regression coeﬃcient indicates that time matters, and its sign whether it contributes
positively or negatively to the probability of an exit. This approach remains limited on
conceptual and analytical grounds and a duration model will be more appropriate.
At a conceptual level duration analysis deals directly with the conditional probability of
an event taking place, rather than with its unconditional probability. The key question is:
”What is the probability that a given regime will end at time t+1, given that it has lasted
up to time t?” The natural way of thinking about the probability that a regime will end at
some point in the future when we believe that the time spent within the regime aﬀects this
same probability is in terms of successive rounds. Suppose that a regime starts in period
1. In period 1, we will consider the probability that the regime will end in period 2. In
period 2, we will consider the probability that the regime will end in period 3, conditional
on the fact that the regime has lasted up to period 2. In period t > 2, we will consider the
probability that the regime will end in period t+1, conditional on the fact that the regime
has lasted up to period t. If we believe that duration is important then the probability of
an exit at some point in the future is naturally considered as a sequence of simpler events.
2This natural view of the problem emphasizes conditional probabilities, not unconditional
ones.
At an analytical level duration models allow for the easy characterization of duration
dependence. If we introduce duration as an explanatory variable in a logit regression and
look at the sign of the estimated coeﬃcient, the probability of an exit either increases or
decreases with duration. In reality, however, there could be a non-monotonic relationship
between the probability of an exit and the duration of a regime. It could be that the
probability of an exit increases at shorter durations but that it decreases beyond a certain
time threshold. Moreover, duration analysis can easily cope with the problem of censoring.
It is likely that some regimes will not be terminated by the end of the sample period. At
the time of writing Hong Kong still has a currency board arrangement. Consequently, the
observation for Hong Kong will be right-censored. Such observations should be taken into
account.
This paper makes use of duration models to study duration dependence across types
of countries using the non-parametric Kaplan-Meier estimator. Moreover, we estimate a
semi-parametric proportional hazard speciﬁcation that allows for time-varying independent
variables in order to identify the determinants of the probability of an exit. Regime du-
rations are constructed on the basis of the de facto classiﬁcation of exchange rate regimes
proposed by Reinhart and Rogoﬀ (2004).
The results show a clear non-monotonic pattern of duration dependence. The non-
parametric Kaplan-Meier estimator reveals that the relationship between the probability of
an exit and the time spent within a regime diﬀers signiﬁcantly across types of countries. The
semi-parametric approach shows that inﬂation, openness and current account balance aﬀect
the conditional probability of an exit. Nevertheless, the pattern of duration dependence
remains non-monotonic even after introducing time-varying covariates. In other words, it
seems that the probability of an exit from a ﬁxed exchange rate regime is aﬀected by the
time spent within this regime, other things being equal.
The paper is organised as follows. Section 2 reviews the literature on exits from ﬁxed
exchange rate regimes. Section 3 introduces important concepts for duration analysis and
3presents the estimation methods. Section 4 deals with the identiﬁcation of regimes, exits
and regime durations. It discusses the various classiﬁcations of exchange rate regimes
that are available and motivates our particular choice. We also describe the explanatory
variables that are included in the estimation of the semi-parametric model. Section 5
provides the results and section 6 concludes.
2 Review of the literature
Some recent empirical work studies the determinants of exits from ﬁxed exchange rate
regimes. These studies diﬀer along several dimensions: exchange rate regime classiﬁca-
tion, identiﬁcation of an exit, type of exit, time period, sample of countries, econometric
methodology, and explanatory variables.
The source of data varies greatly across studies. In turn, the procedure for the identiﬁ-
cation of an exit depends largely on the data that are used. Klein and Marion (1997) focus
on oﬃcial end-of-month exchange rates retrieved from the IMF’s International Financial
Statistics and deﬁne an exit as the end of a period during which there exists a particular
ﬁxed value of the currency with respect to the U.S. dollar. Tudela (2004) combines data
for the nominal exchange rate, the short-term interest rate and international reserves to
build an indicator variable of exchange market pressure. In this context, an exit occurs
whenever the constructed indicator exceeds a given threshold value, thereby ending a tran-
quil period. Setzer (2004) uses the de facto exchange rate regime classiﬁcation proposed
by Levy-Yeyati and Sturzenegger (2005).
These three studies do not really focus on exits from ﬁxed exchange rate regimes.
The ﬁrst two are more related to the literature dealing with the determinants of currency
crises, along the lines of Eichengreen, Rose and Wyplosz (1995), and with the quest for
early warning indicators of such crises, such as Kaminsky, Lizondo and Reinhart (1998).
Moreover, as we discuss below, the de facto classiﬁcation used by Setzer (2004) does not
identify regimes properly. Looking at the stability of the exchange rate and other variables
over time may identify an exit when some parameter describing the exchange rate regime
4changes, while the underlying regime remains the same. For example, these studies would
capture an exit when the central parity of a target zone arrangement is devalued to a new
level. One parameter of the regime changes, but the regime itself has not changed: it is
still a target zone! The classiﬁcation proposed by Reinhart and Rogoﬀ (2004) and used
by both Asici and Wyplosz (2003) and Detragiache, Mody and Okada (2005) deals with
this problem explicitly. Reinhart and Rogoﬀ (2004) focus on a ﬁve-year window to identify
exchange rate regimes on the basis of market-determined nominal exchange rates. Taking
such a perspective allows for a better deﬁnition of regime changes as opposed to changes
in some regime parameter.
The sample of countries varies across studies, including either OECD countries, or Latin
American countries, or a selection of developed, emerging market and other economies, or
all countries. Most of the literature, e.g. Detragiache, Mody and Okada (2005), makes use
of logit or probit regressions, whereby the dependent variable takes a unit value whenever
there is an exit. Masson and Ruge-Murcia (2003) estimate time-varying transition proba-
bilities, which are speciﬁed as nonlinear functions of explanatory variables. There are few
papers that rely on duration models. Tudela (2004) studies the determinants of currency
crises. Meissner (2002) uses duration analysis to explain the decision of countries to join
the classical gold standard. Sosvilla-Rivero, Maroto-Illera and Perez-Bermejo (2002) focus
on the determinants of realignments and exits within the ERM. Blomberg, Frieden and
Stein (2004) and Setzer (2004) make use of a duration approach. However, Setzer (2004)
focuses on a classiﬁcation of regimes that remains inadequate and that is only available
on a yearly basis while some regimes last less than one year. Blomberg, Frieden and Stein
(2004) focus only on Latin American and Caribbean countries and rely on oﬃcially re-
ported exchange rates in their deﬁnition of exchange rate regimes while many countries
have introduced dual exchange rates and/or parallel markets.
Independent variables are usually taken from two strands of literature: the prediction of
currency crises, and optimum currency area criteria. These variables can be classiﬁed under
three main headings: macroeconomic variables, such as the real exchange rate, openness,
trade concentration, ﬁscal policy, monetary policy, inﬂation, growth; ﬁnancial variables,
5such as international reserves, foreign assets, domestic credit, foreign direct investment;
and institutional and political variables, such as regular and irregular executive transfers,
IMF program, corruption, political freedom. Moreover, two studies using logit regressions
include the duration of the exchange rate peg as a determinant of the likelihood of an exit.
Some explanatory variables are signiﬁcant across most studies: inﬂation, competitiveness
as measured by the evolution of the real exchange rate, and openness.
The vast majority of existing research ignores the issue of censoring systematically,
except for those papers using duration models. Suppose that we are focusing on exits
between time t1 and time t2. We will observe some exits between t1 and t2 without being
able to compute the duration when the regime has started before time t1. Conversely,
some regimes will still be in place after time t2, so that we do not observe an exit and
are again not able to compute a duration. The literature on duration models recognizes
this issue as being very important and proposes ways to take censoring into account. To
our knowledge, the studies which include duration as an explanatory variable in a logit
framework disregard the problem. Duttagupta and Otker-Robe (2003) exclude incomplete
spells explicitly. For example, Hong Kong is excluded from the analysis since its currency
board regime is still in place as we write: there is no exit.
3 Econometric methodology
We deﬁne the nonnegative random variable T as the duration (or spell) during which a
ﬁxed exchange rate regime is in place1. The unconditional probability that the spell will be
shorter than some given value t is given by the cumulative distribution function, written
as F(t) = Pr(T < t). The associated probability density function is written as f(t).
Duration analysis makes use of the reverse cumulative distribution function, referred to as
the survivor function, which is written as S(t) = 1 − F(t).
We will estimate the hazard function which captures the conditional probability that
the spell will terminate at time T = t, given that it has survived until time t. It is given










Clearly, both representations in terms of the hazard function and the probability density
function contain exactly the same information. However, the hazard function is useful
in so far as its shape provides a deﬁnition of duration dependence. Positive duration
dependence exists at the point t∗ when dλ(t)/dt > 0 at t = t∗. The probability that a
regime will end increases as the regime increases in length of time. Conversely, negative
duration dependence exists at the point t∗ when dλ(t)/dt < 0 at t = t∗. The condition
that dλ(t)/dt = 0 for every t deﬁnes a so-called memoryless system. Clearly, it is possible
that the hazard function evolves with time in a non-monotonic fashion alternating between
positive and negative duration dependence.
There are diﬀerent approaches to estimating the hazard function. The Kaplan-Meier
estimator is a non-parametric approach. The random spell is written as T ∗ in the absence
of censoring. The censoring time is C. Then, the observed random variable is T =
min(T ∗,C). Suppose that there are k completed durations in our sample of size n, where
k < n since some observations are censored, and because two or more observations can
have the same duration. We deﬁne a variable δ that takes the value 1 if the observation
is censored, and zero otherwise. We assume that if T = t and δ = 1, censoring happens
immediately after time T. We can order the completed durations from smallest to largest,
t1 < t2 < ... < tk. We denote the number of durations that end at time ti by di, and the
number of durations censored between ti and ti+1 by mi. The risk set is the set of durations





The scalar ni is really the number of durations neither completed nor censored before
7duration ti. The probability of ending a regime in the interval t + dt given that the spell





Parametric estimation requires an assumption about the underlying distribution of the
random variable T. Suppose that the distribution of durations is known up to a vector
of parameters θ. The density of a duration is f(t,θ). The only information available on
a censored duration at time tj is that this duration was at least tj. The contribution
to likelihood is then given by the value of the survivor function, S(tj,θ). We can again
construct a dummy variable δ, taking a value of unity when the observation is censored


















In practice, the sample of durations is rarely homogeneous and is aﬀected by various ex-
planatory factors. A convenient speciﬁcation is the proportional hazard (PH) speciﬁcation
which is written as
λ(t,x,β,λ0) = λ0(t)φ(x,β) (4)
= λ0(t)exp(x
0β)
where x is a vector of explanatory variables, and β is a vector of unknown parameters
to be estimated. The so-called baseline hazard λ0 corresponds to the case where φ(.) = 1
and represents the hazard function for the mean individual. Explanatory variables aﬀect
the hazard function by multiplying the baseline hazard by a time-invariant factor φ(.).
This speciﬁcation is convenient for two reasons. First, to the extent that both λ(.) and λ0
8are conditional probabilities, φ(.) will be nonnegative and there is no necessary restriction
on the vector of coeﬃcients β. Second, we can interpret the estimated coeﬃcients as the
constant proportional eﬀect of x on the conditional probability λ(.).
In many practical applications, the underlying distribution is unknown. However, it
is still possible to make no arbitrary assumption about the form of this distribution and
resort to semi-parametric estimation. For the sake of the exposition, suppose that all n
observations are uncensored. We can order observed durations from smallest to largest,
t1 < ... < tn. The conditional probability that the ﬁrst observation concludes a spell at




This quantity is the contribution of the ﬁrst observation to partial likelihood. The
numerator is the hazard for the individual whose spell completes at time t1, while the
denominator is the sum of the hazards for individuals whose spells could have ended at









Only the order of completed durations provides information on the unknown coeﬃ-
cients. The baseline hazard λ0 cancels out and therefore, we do not have to make an
assumption on its underlying distribution. It is recovered from the partial likelihood esti-












We shall proceed in two steps. Firstly, we estimate the hazard function using the
non-parametric estimator for the whole sample and sub-samples of the data. This graph-
ical evidence can illustrate diﬀerences in duration dependence across types of economies.
Secondly, we make use of a proportional hazard speciﬁcation to account for time-varying
explanatory variables to assess how these aﬀect the conditional probability that a given
9exchange rate regime will end. Indeed, it may be that the pattern of duration dependence
shown by the non-parametric estimator is explained by the time-varying behaviour of ex-
planatory factors. In the extreme, we could observe that the time spent within a ﬁxed
exchange rate regime could have no eﬀect on the conditional probability of an exit, once
that the appropriate time-varying factors are taken into account.
4 Data
The identiﬁcation of a duration requires the deﬁnition of a time origin, a time scale, and an
event that ends the duration. We have argued that most studies do not deal with exchange
rate regimes but rather with spells of exchange rate stability. Focusing exclusively on the
behaviour of the nominal exchange rate or on an index of exchange market pressure may
lead us to conclude that a regime changes, when in fact only some parameter describing
this regime changes. Therefore, we need a classiﬁcation of exchange rate regimes that takes
this problem into account.
4.1 Exchange rate regime classiﬁcation
Most empirical studies on exchange rate regimes have relied on the classiﬁcation available
from the IMF’s Annual Report on Exchange Arrangements and Exchange Restrictions
which is constructed according to oﬃcial declarations made by national governments once
a year. It has been criticized, in particular on the ground that countries do not always do
what they say they are doing. Countries that declare a ﬂexible exchange rate regime often
intervene in the foreign exchange market to such an extent that in practice there is little
diﬀerence in the behaviour of the nominal exchange rate relative to countries that have
explicit ﬁxed exchange rates (Calvo and Reinhart, 2002). Moreover, repeated devaluations
of ﬁxed exchange rate parities, especially in countries prone to high inﬂation, make the
exchange rate regime look like a ﬂexible arrangement.
Recent new classiﬁcations have been constructed to address the shortcomings of the
IMF’s de jure classiﬁcation. Bubula and Otker-Robe (2002) combine qualitative and quan-
10titative information to provide a monthly classiﬁcation that covers all IMF members since
1990. Most information is obtained through bilateral consultation discussions with mem-
ber countries, as well as through regular contacts with IMF desk economists, supplemented
by other sources of information such as press reports, news articles, and other relevant pa-
pers, and supported by an analysis of the observed behaviour of the nominal exchange
rate and international reserves. Ghosh, Gulde and Wolf (2002) construct an annual index
of exchange rate ﬂexibility that is mapped into a discrete number of regime categories
according to the relative frequency distribution of the de jure annual classiﬁcation.
Some approaches disregard qualitative information altogether and rely exclusively on
observed macroeconomic time series. Shambaugh (2004) constructs a binary classiﬁcation
of ﬁxed and ﬂexible regimes, on the basis on the monthly behaviour of the nominal exchange
rate. A ﬁxed exchange rate regime is identiﬁed if the exchange rate has remained within ±2
percent bands against the base currency during the year. Levy-Yeyati and Sturzenegger
(2005) make use of a cluster analysis to classify countries into diﬀerent regime categories
according to the volatility of exchange rates and international reserves. A ﬁxed exchange
rate regime is typically characterized by volatility in international reserves in order to
stabilize the exchange rate at the announced parity. In contrast, ﬂoating exchange rates
feature signiﬁcant exchange rate volatility while foreign exchange reserves remain rather
stable.
Reinhart and Rogoﬀ (2004) address two important issues that other studies have not
examined. Firstly, the existence of dual or multiple exchange rates, and/or parallel mar-
kets, means that market-determined exchange rates can diﬀer signiﬁcantly from oﬃcially
reported exchange rates. Failing to look at market-determined rates leads to misleading
perceptions about the underlying monetary policy and the ability of the economy to ad-
just to shocks. Secondly, other classiﬁcations identify short-term spells of exchange rate
stability within a regime rather than regimes themselves. The realignment of a central
parity in a target zone would be captured as a regime change in other classiﬁcations, when
in fact only a parameter of the regime changes. Reinhart and Rogoﬀ (2004) use historical
chronologies to assess whether there are dual or multiple exchange rates, and/or paral-
11lel markets. They use a battery of descriptive statistics applied to the behaviour of the
market-determined nominal exchange rate and classify countries according to fourteen cat-
egories on a monthly basis. They consider a ﬁve-year window in order to avoid focusing
on short-term spells. The new classiﬁcation diﬀers signiﬁcantly from the oﬃcially reported
exchange rate arrangements.
We adopt the de facto classiﬁcation constructed by Reinhart and Rogoﬀ (2004). It is
available at a monthly frequency over a long time period, avoids identifying short spells of
exchange rate stability as regimes, takes account of the fact that countries may have dual or
multiple exchange rates, and/or parallel markets, and is not based on oﬃcial declarations
but rather on the actions of monetary authorities.
4.2 Deﬁnition of exits and durations
The time origin for each duration is deﬁned as the ﬁrst month during which the classiﬁcation
shows any type of a ﬁxed exchange rate regime. We deﬁne an exit from a ﬁxed to a ﬂexible
exchange rate regime as a shift from any ﬁxed category to managed ﬂoating, free ﬂoating
or free falling. The sample period extends from January 1974 until December 2001. Each
duration corresponds to the number of months from the time origin until the ending event.
If a regime is still in place by December 2001 we count the number of months until that
date and register the observation as being censored.
This operational deﬁnition runs into a problem of left truncation. A number of exchange
rate regimes will start before January 1974. This does not aﬀect the estimations of non-
parametric and semi-parametric speciﬁcations. The Kaplan-Meier calculation of the hazard
function makes use of the number of regimes that are eligible to fail, and this number will
capture the fact that these regimes are not at risk of failing (since they all survived) until
they come under observation. The semi-parametric approach uses only observations at
times of failure. The simple fact that a regime is observed in January 1974 means that it
did not fail before. This is true for all regimes observed in January 1974, so none of these
regimes can have failed before that date. Hence, we would not have any observation to
contribute to partial likelihood.
124.3 Explanatory variables
The proportional hazard model allows for time-varying explanatory variables. We select
these variables on the basis of empirical studies dealing with the determinants of the onset
of currency crises, and with the factors underlying the optimal choice of an exchange rate
regime2. Macroeconomic variables include inﬂation, economic growth, openness, current
account balance, budget balance, unemployment, the real exchange rate, and a dummy
variable for a banking crisis. Financial variables consist of the rate of growth of interna-
tional reserves and the level of ﬁnancial development. Finally, institutional factors include
the level of central bank independence, the quality of institutions (proxied by an index of
political rights) and a dummy variable for the presence of capital controls.
The partial likelihood estimation procedure implies that we will use data only at times
of failures. Since our durations are calculated in months, we should use monthly values
of explanatory variables at times of failures. However, we could not collect data at the
monthly frequency for each time-varying covariate. When such data are not available, we
use the value for the year before that which contains the month during which a failure
occurs. This choice is clearly arbitrary. However, it is likely to minimise the possible
endogeneity of macroeconomic and ﬁnancial variables. An exit represents a signiﬁcant
change in the structure of the economy and many variables are likely to respond to such a
change.
5 Results
This section presents our results in three steps. We start with some descriptive statistics on
the computed durations and calculate estimates of the hazard function using the Kaplan-
Meier estimator. Finally, we show the estimates of the proportional hazard model.
2We discuss the source and measurement of our variables in the appendix.
135.1 Descriptive analysis
The full sample between January 1974 and December 2001 yields 87 durations for 58 coun-
tries. Fifty-one observations correspond to regimes that have ended before or in December
2001, and the remaining 36 observations are right-censored. We disaggregate this num-
ber between developed and emerging economies3. Table 1 provides summary statistics
(expressed in months) on durations for the two diﬀerent types of countries.
Table 1: Summary statistics for durations (expressed in months)
Full sample Developed Emerging
Obs 87 33 54
Failed 51 16 35
Censored 36 17 19
Mean 140 188 111
Median 105 196 78
Stdev 176 126 99
Min 3 3 3
Max 336 336 336
Regimes can last for a very long period of time. Fourteen countries exhibit a ﬁxed
exchange rate during our entire sample. Regimes can also be very short, lasting three
months. The mean for the full sample of countries equals 140 months, about 12 years.
This number is in line with Husain, Mody and Rogoﬀ (2004), and contradicts previous
studies on the evolution of exchange rate regimes. Klein and Marion (1997) report a mean
duration of 32 months. The diﬀerence reﬂects the underlying deﬁnition of an exchange
rate regime. We focus on exchange rate regimes whereas previous studies focus on short-
term exchange rate spells. Moreover, ﬁxed exchange regimes in the developed world last
3Developed economies include Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Cyprus, Denmark, Finland,
France, Germany, Greece, Hong Kong, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway,
Portugal, Singapore, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, United Kingdom, and United States. Emerg-
ing markets include Argentina, Brazil, Bulgaria, Chile, China, Colombia, Czech Republic, Ecuador, Egypt,
Estonia, Hungary, India, Indonesia, Israel, Jordan, Korea, Latvia, Lithuania, Malaysia, Mexico, Morocco,
Pakistan, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Romania, Russia, Slovak Republic, Thailand, Turkey, Uruguay, and
Venezuela.
14Figure 1: Estimated hazard function, all countries
signiﬁcantly longer than those of emerging market economies4.
5.2 Non-parametric estimation
Figure 1 presents the estimated hazard function obtained with the Kaplan-Meier estima-
tor for the full sample. A clear non-monotonic pattern of duration dependence appears.
More precisely, it alternates between increasing and decreasing parts. Therefore, duration
dependence cannot be qualiﬁed as being either positive, or negative: it depends upon sur-
vival time. Probit and logit regressions will not be able to capture the eﬀect of duration
on the probability of an exit adequately. Furthermore, it remains diﬃcult to provide for
an interpretation of such duration dependence. It could arise from the fact that credibility
is only gradually achieved after the adoption of a ﬁxed exchange rate regime. The condi-
tional probability of an exit would rise initially. Conditional on survival up to a certain
time threshold, however, this probability would then start declining.
Our descriptive analysis shows that regime durations vary across types of countries.
4Clearly, our summary statistics are computed under the implicit assumption that regimes start in
January 1974 or later, and that they end in December 2001 or before. This is obviously misleading
since some observations are left-truncated and others are right-censored. However, these numbers indicate
some country heterogeneity and overall trends which are useful information for the construction of the
semi-parametric speciﬁcation.
15Figure 2: Estimated hazard functions, by country type
Figure 3: Estimated survivor functions, by country type
16Figure 2 estimates separate hazard functions and shows that there are pronounced diﬀer-
ences in the shape of the hazard functions depending on country type. Developed economies
exhibit almost no duration dependence. Emerging market economies are characterised by
a higher hazard function with a non-monotonic pattern of duration dependence. Figure 3
presents estimates of the survivor functions and conﬁrms this evidence. A log-rank test of
the equality of survivor functions rejects the null hypothesis at the 1% level.
The bipolar hypothesis of exchange rate regimes claims that in a world of highly inte-
grated ﬁnancial markets, ﬁxed exchange rate regimes are not sustainable in the long run
and will inevitably collapse at some point. In terms of duration dependence, the hypoth-
esis can be interpreted as positive duration dependence. In other words, the conditional
probability of an exit will not decrease over time. Our results for emerging markets could
suggest that this hypothesis is not supported by the data since a signiﬁcant portion of
the hazard function is decreasing. However, such a conclusion is doubtful for at least two
reasons. Firstly, we should control for other factors which are likely to aﬀect the viability
of a ﬁxed exchange rate regime, such as the degree of openness of the economy and the
respective stance of ﬁscal and monetary policies. Secondly, the bipolar hypothesis holds
that countries which are ﬁnancially integrated will move to the corners, either hard pegs
or ﬂoats. Our aggregation of hard and intermediate regimes together allows us to examine
the move from ﬁxing to ﬂoating only. Future research should disaggregate the data across
diﬀerent types of pegging arrangements.
Finally, we examine the hazard function that results when censored observations are
excluded. The sample reduces to 51 observations. Figure 4 separates between types of
countries and shows that both functions indicate (close to) positive duration dependence at
all times, in particular for developed economies. Therefore, excluding censored observations
aﬀects the nature of duration dependence dramatically. Moreover, and not surprisingly,
the estimated values for the hazards increase, reﬂecting the bias that obtains when the
problem of right-censoring is ignored.
17Figure 4: Estimated hazard functions, by country type, only observed exits
5.3 Semi-parametric estimation
Non-parametric estimations show a non-monotonic pattern of duration dependence that
varies across types of countries. Consequently, we control for country-speciﬁc time-varying
explanatory variables by estimating a proportional hazard model. The baseline speciﬁca-
tion (I) includes selected macroeconomic and ﬁnancial variables, namely inﬂation, growth,
international reserves, openness, the current account, budget balance and the rate of un-
employment. Other speciﬁcations (II) to (VI) test for the robustness of the results arising
from our initial speciﬁcation by including alternatively capital controls, a banking crisis
index, the degree of ﬁnancial development, political rights, changes in the real exchange
rate, central bank independence, and a country dummy variable. In the end, we are trying
to explain the time-varying feature of duration dependence and see whether including ex-
planatory variables aﬀects this feature. Table 2 presents the results. We report the number
of observations and the p-value of a chi-squared test for the overall validity of the model.
The null hypothesis that the coeﬃcients are jointly zero is always strongly rejected.
The coeﬃcients for the degree of openness and current account balance are always
negative and signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero. A greater degree of openness to the rest of































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































19The coeﬃcient on the rate of inﬂation is always positive and almost always signiﬁcant,
except when an index of central bank independence is included. A greater degree of
governor turnover (less central bank independence) implies an increasing probability of an
exit. The fact that we cannot reject the null hypothesis that the coeﬃcient on inﬂation is
zero may be attributed to the well-known relationship between inﬂation and central bank
independence. Economic growth matters weakly in some speciﬁcations, while the rate of
growth of international reserves remains insigniﬁcant in all speciﬁcations. Budget balance
appears to be signiﬁcant in two models only. The coeﬃcients on the rate of unemployment
is usually signiﬁcant but carries a surprising negative sign. We would have expected that
a greater rate of unemployment would lead policymakers to adopt a ﬂoating exchange rate
regime, thereby reducing the survival of ﬁxed exchange rate regimes.
Our results show that the conditional probability of an exit is not signiﬁcantly aﬀected
by the presence of capital controls, the occurrence of a banking crisis, the degree of ﬁnancial
development, the overall quality of institutions within the country and the behaviour of
the real exchange rate. However, we note that most coeﬃcients on these variables carry
the expected sign. For example, the incidence of a banking crisis would correspond to
an increased probability of an exit, other things being equal. In general, the baseline
speciﬁcation captures most of country heterogeneity. A dummy variable for an emerging
market country is signiﬁcant at the 10% level only.
Partial likelihood estimation allows for the retrieval of the baseline hazard function.
Figure 5 presents a smoothed version of this function and shows that even after having
controlled for macroeconomic, ﬁnancial and institutional variables, the shape of the haz-
ard function remains relatively unaﬀected. It still remains that it increases initially and
then alternates between decreasing and increasing parts. Two diﬀerent interpretations are
possible. On the one hand, we could argue that time matters per se and that theoretical
models should thus investigate the role of duration as a potential factor aﬀecting optimal
exchange rate policy. On the other hand, one may argue that we have not controlled for
every possible time-varying variable. This alternative view would imply that time may
not matter after all, and that we have simply omitted important covariates. We cannot
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state which of these two views is correct. One possible extension would be to take account
of unobserved heterogeneity explicitly, so as to control for the eﬀect of omitted variables.
Time would matter whenever the estimated baseline hazard function still remains diﬀerent
from a horizontal line. We leave this issue for further research.
6 Concluding remarks
This paper studies the conditional probability of an exit from a ﬁxed exchange rate regime.
When we believe that the time spent within a regime is an important determinant of
the probability of exiting this regime, the natural view of exits emphasizes conditional
probabilities instead of unconditional ones and duration models are an appropriate tool.
We use both non-parametric and semi-parametric techniques to obtain estimates of the
hazard functions. The application of the non-parametric Kaplan-Meier estimator uncov-
ers signiﬁcant non-monotonic patterns of duration dependence that diﬀers across types
of countries. To the extent that duration dependence may be driven by time-varying co-
variates, we also estimate a semi-parametric proportional hazard speciﬁcation by partial
maximum likelihood. Having controlled for macroeconomic, ﬁnancial and institutional
variables, we conclude that the pattern of duration dependence remains non-monotonic.
21Therefore, it seems that the time spent within a regime is itself a signiﬁcant determinant
of the probability of an exit.
The issue of duration dependence deserves further investigation. Firstly, the results
obtained from the estimation of the proportional hazard speciﬁcation can be interpreted
in two ways. On the one hand, we can argue that the time spent within a peg matters. On
the other hand, we could also claim that we have not controlled for every possible time-
varying explanatory factor, so that the pattern of duration dependence persists because of
omitted variables. We believe that this problem should be studied further by introducing
more explanatory variables, and by taking explicit account of unobserved heterogeneity.
Secondly, this paper aggregates all possible types of ﬁxed exchange rate regimes into a
single category. It is doubtful, however, that hard pegs such as dollarization or currency
boards exhibit the same properties as soft target zones or even moving bands of ﬂuctuation.
Therefore, the analysis should be reﬁned by disaggregating ﬁxed exchange rate regimes
into several categories. In turn, this would increase the number of possible exits between
regimes. We could study exits from hard ﬁxing to soft ﬁxing, soft ﬁxing to hard ﬁxing,
hard ﬁxing to ﬂoating, and soft ﬁxing to ﬂoating. In turn, we could also focus on exits
from ﬂoating regimes. There are several possible combinations of exits and these may
exhibit diﬀerent patterns of duration dependence. Disaggregating across ﬁner categories of
exchange rate regimes would also allow for a discussion of the bipolar hypothesis in terms of
duration dependence. In this paper, the aggregation of all types of ﬁxing strategies within
a single category implies that we can only study one corner solution, the move towards
ﬂoating exchange rates.
Finally, we have ignored a potential problem of selection bias. Some of the factors
that aﬀect the duration of an exchange rate regime may also aﬀect the decision to enter
such a regime in the ﬁrst place. For example, high inﬂation could possibly lead a country
to adopt a rigidly ﬁxed exchange rate within the scope of a broader disinﬂation strategy.
The evolution of the rate of inﬂation during the peg will also aﬀect the duration of this
arrangement. The study of selection bias in the context of duration models is still in its
infancy and we leave this aspect for further investigation.
22References
[1] Asici, A., Wyplosz, C., 2003. The art of gracefully exiting a peg. The Economic and
Social Review 34, 211-228.
[2] Beck, T., Demirguc-Kunt, A., Levine, R., 1999. A new database on ﬁnancial develop-
ment and structure. World Bank Policy Research Working Paper 2146.
[3] Blomberg, S., Frieden, J., Stein, E., 2004. Sustaining ﬁxed rates: the political economy
of currency pegs in Latin America. Manuscript.
[4] Bubula, A., Otker-Robe, I., 2002. The evolution of exchange rate regimes since 1990:
evidence from de facto policies. IMF Working Paper 155.
[5] Calvo, G., Reinhart, C., 2002. Fear of ﬂoating. The Quarterly Journal of Economics
117, 379-408.
[6] Detragiache, E., Mody, A., Okada, E., 2005. Exits from heavily managed exchange
rate regimes. IMF Working Paper 39.
[7] Duttagupta, R., Otker-Robe, I., 2003. Exits from pegged regimes: an empirical anal-
ysis. IMF Working Paper 147.
[8] Eichengreen, B., Rose, A., Wyplosz, C., 1995. Exchange market mayhem: the an-
tecedents and aftermath of speculative attacks. Economic Policy 21, 249-312.
[9] Ghosh, A., Gulde, A., Wolf, H., 2002. Exchange Rate Regimes, Choices and Conse-
quences. MIT Press, Cambridge.
[10] Husain, A., Mody, A., Rogoﬀ, K., 2005. Exchange rate regime durability and perfor-
mance in developing versus advanced economies. Journal of Monetary Economics 52,
35-64.
[11] Kaminsky, G., Lizondo, S., Reinhart, C., 1998. Leading indicators of currency crises.
IMF Staﬀ Papers 45, 1-48.
23[12] Kiefer, N., 1988. Economic duration data and hazard functions. Journal of Economic
Literature 26, 646-679.
[13] Klein, M., Marion, N., 1997. Explaining the duration of exchange-rate pegs. Journal
of Development Economics 54, 387-404.
[14] Levy-Yeyati, E., Sturzenegger, F., 2005. Classifying exchange rate regimes: deeds vs.
words. European Economic Review 49, 1603-1635.
[15] Masson, P., Ruge-Murcia, F., 2003. Explaining the transition between exchange rate
regimes. CIREQ Working Paper 15.
[16] Meissner, C., 2002. A new world order: explaining the emergence of the classical gold
standard. NBER Working Paper 9233.
[17] Reinhart, C., Rogoﬀ, K., 2004. The modern history of exchange rate arrangements: a
reinterpretation. Quarterly Journal of Economics 119, 1-48.
[18] Setzer, R., 2004. The political economy of exchange rate regime duration: a survival
analysis. Manuscript, University of Hohenheim.
[19] Shambaugh, J., 2004. The eﬀect of ﬁxed exchange rates on monetary policy. The
Quarterly Journal of Economics 119, 301-352.
[20] Sosvilla-Rivero, S., Maroto-Illera, R., Perez-Bermejo, F., 2002. An electic approach to
currency crises: drawing lessons from the EMS experience. FEDEA Working Paper
22.
[21] Tudela, M., 2004. Explaining currency crises: a duration model approach. Journal of
International Money and Finance 23, 799-816.
24Appendix: Explanatory variables
Inﬂation: International Financial Statistics, IMF, line 64.
GDP growth: World Development Indicators, World Bank.
Openness: sum of exports and imports divided by gross domestic product. World Devel-
opment Indicators, World Bank.
Current account balance: ratio to gross domestic product. World Development Indicators,
World Bank.
Overall budget balance: ratio to gross domestic product. World Development Indicators,
World Bank.
Unemployment rate: Economic Outlook, OECD; International Financial Statistics, IMF,
line 67.
Real eﬀective exchange: average monthly growth. Ghosh, Gulde and Wolf (2002).
Banking crisis: dummy variable. Ghosh, Gulde and Wolf (2002).
International reserves: International Financial Statistics, IMF, line 1L.
Financial development: liquid liabilities of the entire ﬁnancial sector relative to gross do-
mestic product. Beck, Demirguc-Kunt and Levine (1999).
Central bank independence: rate of governor turnover per ﬁve years, Ghosh, Gulde and
Wolf (2002).
Political rights: Freedom in the World survey, Freedom House.
Capital controls: binary index. Ghosh, Gulde and Wolf (2002).
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